


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Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080002-9

14 NOV 1978

DCI/RM 78-5462



File *Security*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

SUBJECT: Reactions to the President's Acknowledgment
of the Fact of Satellite Photoreconnaissance

REFERENCE: State Dept Memo to Dr. Brzezinski; same subject,
dtd Oct 14, 1978

1. (U) Action Requested: None. For your information only.

2. (C) Background:

a. The President directed declassification of the "fact of" satellite photoreconnaissance and publicly acknowledged this fact in a 1 October speech on space policy.

b. The Department of State was tasked, by the NSC, to prepare and implement a consultation plan to minimize the risk of adverse foreign reaction. This plan was implemented just prior to the President's announcement, (during the period from 27-29 September).

c. Reference (attached) contains the State Department's summary of reactions to the President's announcement.

3. (S) Discussion:


a. No adverse reactions have been noted among those of the Congress, the U.S. public, the Soviets, our Allies, the U.N., and foreign media. Soviet Minister Vasev did note, however, that official U.S. acknowledgment could touch on the sensitivities of third countries and that they may have some problems.

25X1

State Dept., NSC reviews completed

SECRET

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Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080002-9

SUBJECT: Reactions to the President's Acknowledgement of
the Fact of Satellite Photoreconnaissance

b. The discussion of the U.S. public reaction is interesting because it points out (as we had predicted at the SPRC meeting) that acknowledgment of the "fact of" has not completely relieved public concern about verification of a SALT TWO agreement and that the public continues to show skepticism and a fascination with "hardware". The State Department memo concludes that "In the end, some discussion of satellite photoreconnaissance beyond "fact of" may be required to overcome public cynicism. An interagency task force chaired by the DCI is examining the specific issue of a selective and phased release of photoreconnaissance imagery. An options paper is due to the PRC (Space) by February 15, 1979." This conclusion underlines my previous comments to you about the importance of the DCI sponsored study on release of photoreconnaissance imagery and my concern about pressures for early release in support of SALT TWO ratification.

c. I have taken steps to circulate this memo within the Intelligence Community.



25X1

Attachment:
State Dept Memo dtd
14 Oct, 78

Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080002-9

SECRET

SUBJECT: Reactions to the President's Acknowledgment of the Fact of
Satellite Photoreconnaissance

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Distribution: (DCI/RM [redacted])

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DCI/RM/PAO/ [redacted] (2 Nov 78)

W/SECRET ATTACHMENT



Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080002-9

Washington, D.C. 20520

Received: 31 Oct, 1978

October 23, 1978

25X1

MEMORANDUM TO: DCI -
NASA - Mr. Williamson
OSD/ISA - Maj. O'Hern
JCS - Maj. Genega

FROM: PM/SA - Arnold Kanter

Reactions to the President's Acknowledgement of
the Fact of Satellite Photoreconnaissance


Frank Press's office asked the State Department to report on reactions to the declassification of the fact of satellite photoreconnaissance. Our summary was intended to survey the responses we've received so far and to note some areas in which follow-up may be needed.

The attached copy is provided for your information.

UNCLASSIFIED

W/SECRET ATTACHMENT

Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080002-9



Washington DC 20570

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COPIES TO:

October 14, 1978

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VP

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DR. FRANK PRESS

THE WHITE HOUSE

NR
ES
CDA
F-ws

Subject: Reactions to President's Acknowledgment of
the Fact of Satellite Photoreconnaissance

The following is a summary of reactions to the
President's announcement contained in his October 1
speech on space policy.

Congressional

Beginning on September 27, State Department/
Congressional Relations contacted the following congress-
sional offices about the decision to declassify and
acknowledge "fact of" in the President's October 1
speech: Bayh, Byrd, Church, Clark, Cranston, Culver,
Glenn, Hamilton, Hart, Kennedy, Mathias, Pell, Proxmire,
Stennis, and Zablocki.

The general reaction was that this announcement
would be a bit of a non-event, but they were glad the
Administration was finally officially acknowledging
what had been an "open secret" for some time. They
did recognize that this would make the Administration's
job easier in explaining verification of SALT. There
were no negative responses on the Hill during the
consultations nor following the President's speech.

US Public Reactions

Verification is probably the paramount public con-
cern about SALT. We must be able to deal with this
issue in a concrete and easily understood fashion if
we are to avoid the untenable position of saying
"trust us."

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DECLASSIFICATION OF THE FACT OF RECEIVING PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE DOES NOT CHANGE THE UNFOLDABLE US VIEW OF U.S. State Department officials have had about 40 speaking engagements since the fact of photoreconnaissance satellites was declassified. This preliminary experience indicates that declassification of the "fact of" has increased public confidence but has not completely relieved public concern about verification of a SALT TWO agreement. Speakers have tried to direct the discussion to broader aspects of verification (principles, elements of the Treaty which enhance verification, etc.) but the public continues to show skepticism and a fascination with "hardware." As the debates about SALT ratification proceed and we get a better feel for the precise nature of the public's concerns, we will better be able to judge whether any additional steps may be necessary or desirable. In the end, some discussion of satellite photoreconnaissance beyond "fact of" may be required to overcome public cynicism. An interagency task force chaired by the DCI is examining the specific issue of a selective and phased release of photoreconnaissance imagery. An options paper is due to the PRC (Space) by February 15, 1979.

Soviets

Thus far, there has been no Soviet reaction to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Goodby informed Soviet Minister Vasev on September 29. Vasev, speaking personally, said that the Soviet Union would not have any problem with the President's acknowledgment and noted that photoreconnaissance satellites were the "backbone" of both sides' verification capabilities. He said, however, that official US acknowledgment could touch on the sensitivities of third countries and that they might have some problems. He observed that photoreconnaissance satellites had never been officially acknowledged by the Soviet Union. Vasev expressed some concern that declassification could have ramifications for a number of issues such as those being dealt with in the UN Outer Space Committee.

There has been no further Soviet diplomatic response since the September 29 Goodby-Vasev meeting.

Allies reaction to the fact of receiving photo-reconnaissance satellites has been positive and they have expressed public confidence for opposing international agreements which they plan to sign.

Ambassador Bennett informed the NATO allies at the September 27 NAC. The announcement was received without reaction or comment.

The French DCM to NATO was informed privately that declassification of the fact of satellite photo-reconnaissance does not change the unfavorable US view of the French proposal for an international verification agency. The French DCM expressed disappointment.

Except for Australia, the other allies who were informed made no comment or reaction. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs requested additional information, including the text of the President's speech, to ensure that they could fully brief government ministers.

Special Australian interest is due in part to the Government's need to be able publicly to explain and defend US defense policies and practices that may involve Australia. It also reflects the aftermath of a recent episode in which the Minister of Defense was uninformed about an aspect of our relationship when queried by the Opposition in Parliament.

The Australian actions primarily were precautionary. Department of Foreign Affairs officials predicted no particular problems and none have arisen as a result of the President's speech.

United Nations

Thus far, there has been no delegate reaction to the President's announcement. It is likely, however, that interested governments still are considering what public position they should take. They may express their interests and possible concerns as early as October 16 when the UN Special Political Committee addresses outer space issues. Work is underway to formulate a US presentation.

We also are likely to encounter related issues in the weeks and months ahead:

French proposal. The USG has been trying to dissuade France from tabling a proposal at the UNGA calling for the creation of international satellite verification. Now that the US has publicly acknowledged the role of satellites in verifying compliance with arms control agreements, we will face the task of making a persuasive public case for opposing international verification if the French go ahead with their plan.

Accusations of "Spying." There may be an effort in the UN to condemn as espionage or a violation of international law either (a) all satellite photo-reconnaissance undertaken without the permission of the sensed State or, more likely, (b) all such reconnaissance except in the context of verification of arms control agreements or with the sensed State's prior approval. If such charges are made or a resolution along these lines is proposed, our response will be to reiterate the need for satellite verification of arms control agreements and to stress that no principle of international law prohibits remote sensing of the earth from outer space.

UN Outer Space Committee (OSC). If the issue of "fact of" is raised in the OSC, we will distinguish between remote sensing of the earth and its national environment and photoreconnaissance for arms control verification, and will try to get the latter issue referred to other UN forums.

Certain of our positions on principles relating to remote sensing, including our stance on a long-standing Soviet proposal on resolution limits for open dissemination, will need to be reassessed in time for the meetings of the Legal Subcommittee and the Scientific Subcommittee which begin in February. That review will begin soon.

Foreign Media Reaction

A review of FBIS reports indicates that the President's acknowledgment of satellite photoreconnaissance was reported in a wide variety of countries, but was not covered extensively. A few stories were supportive, most were simply brief news reports, and some were critical. No pattern of reactions is apparent: the story was covered by the East European press in about the same way as the Western European and Third World press. The President's acknowledgment apparently was not covered by Soviet media. There is no evidence of continuing foreign media interest.

The content of most of the stories appeared to be drawn from Jody Powell's backgrounder which drew attention to the fact that this was the first time that the US had officially acknowledged satellite photoreconnaissance. Many stories noted that this simply was official confirmation of what was already well known.

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- 5 -

The tone of most of the stories was "matter-of-fact-reporting." The number of explicit commentaries and editorials was negligible. On the other hand, the overwhelming proportion of reports referred to "spy" satellites, several referred to "espionage," and some characterized the President as "admitting" or "confessing" the fact of satellite photoreconnaissance. A large number of stories simply reported that the US had officially admitted that it uses satellites to "spy on the Soviet Union and other countries" and failed to make the connection to SALT and arms control verification.

Notwithstanding these apparent pejoratives, there was little explicit criticism. This may simply reflect a cynical resignation about the conduct of great powers. The context, however, suggests that in many cases, reporters simply used "spy" as a synonym for "reconnaissance." To some extent, use of these terms also may be artifacts of translating the President's speech into the native language and then translating the resulting foreign language reports back into English.

No ICA posts have reported significant local media reaction nor have defense attaches detected major media attention to the announcement. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research has not received any reactions or responses through its channels.

Peter Tarnoff
Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL with
SECRET--XGDS(B)(2) Attachment

DD/A Registry

78-3819/4

October 5, 1978

DD/A Registry


File Security

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
The Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for September 20, 1978
Policy Review Committee (Space) Meeting

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions from the
September 20, 1978 PRC (Space) Meeting. This Summary
should be held very closely.


Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

September 20, 1978

SECRET--XGDS(2)

Time and Place: 9:30-11:30 a.m., Room 305, OEOB

Subject: Space - Part 1 (9:30-10:00 a.m.) "Fact of"
Reconnaissance Discussion
Part 2 (10:00-11:30 a.m.) Civil
Space Policy

Participants:

State

Lucy Benson, Under Sec for
Sec Asst, Science & Tech
Thomas Pickering, Dep Under
Sec for Sec Asst, Science
& Technology - Designee
David Gompert, Dep Dir, Bur
of Politico-Mil Affairs**

Defense


Stanley Resor, Under Sec for
Policy

Adm Daniel Murphy, Dep Under
Sec for Policy

JCS

LtGen William Y. Smith, Asst
to the Chairman

CIA



ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny, Dep Director
James Timbie, Strategic
Affairs Division Chief

NASA

Robert A. Frosch
David Williamson, Asst for
Spec Projects

Agriculture

Howard Hjort, Director of
Economics*

Harold L. Stickland, Remote
Sensing Coordinator*

Commerce

Richard Frank, Admin, Nat'l
Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin*
George Benson, Assoc Admin, Nat'l
Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin*

Energy

John Deutch, Dir of Ofc of
Energy Research*

National Science Foundation

George C. Pimental, Dep Dir*
William Howard, Dir of Div of
Astronomical Sciences*

AID

Robert Nooter, Dep Director*
Charles Paul, Ofc of Science
and Technology*

OMB

Bowman Cutter, Exec Assoc Dir
for Budget

Daniel Taft, Dep Assoc Dir, Sp
Studies Div for Nat'l Sec &
Int'l Affairs

Interior

James Joseph, Under Secretary*
Gordon Law, Spec Asst to the
Secretary*

White House

Stuart Eisenstat*

David Aaron

Al Stern*

OSTP

Frank Press

Art Morrissey, Staff Member

Phil Smith, Staff Member

NSC

BrigGen Robert Rosenberg

Ben Huberman

* 10:00 meeting only.

** 9:30 meeting only.

SECRET--XGDS (2)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Policy Review Committee met to review several issues requiring decisions and to endorse or comment on recommendations of the interagency working group.

PART 1

The Chairman summarized the historical background associated with "fact of" reconnaissance from space, noting that PD/NSC-37 downgraded classification of space reconnaissance to "Confidential." The issue to be decided was declassification of the "fact of" photoreconnaissance from space vs. continued classification.

State and ACDA both strongly endorsed the need to declassify--arguing that this will be essential to attain public support for SALT II. State feels that imagery should not be declassified. ACDA, however, supported further study of this issue.

CIA, NASA, OSD, JCS, and the NSC all expressed the view that to attain fully useful value in declassifying the "fact of"--the further step of selectively declassifying imagery and information from space reconnaissance was essential. OSD and the JCS felt that further careful study of the imagery declassification issue was still required. On the other hand, OMB and NASA supported the NSC view that it is desirable to declassify the fact of now, that we can develop implementation plans to protect those products and capabilities that need protecting, and that we could complete the necessary efforts in the near future--rather than continue to study--as we have done for at least the last five years. CIA concluded that the Kampiles case could have some impact on this subject; i.e., the courts forcing acknowledgement of the "fact of" if successful prosecution is to be obtained. State and ACDA expressed the view that any political utility associated with acknowledgement would be lost under such circumstances.

The Chairman summarized that the majority supported declassification of the "fact of" now and that as a next step an implementation plan for selective declassification of imagery and attributed information from space reconnaissance would be developed.

He asked that for the "fact of," State develop a political plan for consultation with Congress, Allies and the Soviets--resolving international legal considerations, that ACDA prepare appropriate Q's and A's, and that the DCI develop a security plan working with Defense to protect technology operations and products. These action plans are to be

provided to the PRC within two weeks. The next step on declassification of imagery will follow within the near future.

PART 2

The Chairman outlined the first issue, the need for endorsement of an overarching civil space policy proposal composed of three broad tenants.

There was generally interagency consensus that the broad policies outlined were appropriate and emphasized that they should be stated very positively as the Chairman had.

Regarding the second issue, "Should we establish an operational civil earth resources remote sensing system based on the experience derived from LANDSAT?" there were three options: Option 1--Defer a decision at this time; Option 2--Guarantee the continuation of LANDSAT-type remote sensing data; and Option 3--Commit now to an eventual operational LANDSAT-type remote sensing satellite system.

OMB, Defense, and JCS recommended Option 1 on the belief that many users are still unwilling to commit to LANDSAT data. State, Commerce, and Interior recommended Option 3 since domestic and international users are presently exploiting LANDSAT effectively. The Domestic Policy Staff supported Option 3 but reserved final recommendation until budget time. The majority of other agencies recommended Option 2 which guarantees data for a fixed period of time. NASA stated that, in fact, LANDSAT is presently an operational system both internationally and domestically. The Chairman concluded that there was seemingly convergence around Option 2 with language variances toward 1 and 3; that in accordance with PD-37 private sector participation in remote sensing and potential availability of declassified reconnaissance imagery must be taken into account in any final decision.

In the communications satellite area the following issues were covered: (1) What role should the Federal government play in actively stimulating communications research and development, and (2) should the government facilitate public service satellite systems for domestic use as well as international assistance programs? On R&D all recommended that NASA could undertake carefully-selected communications technology R&D projects in competition with other items in the budget process.

There was disagreement on public service systems. Three options were considered: Option 1--Continue to rely on

SECRET--XGDS (2)

the common carriers and public consortium; Option 2--Designate a lead agency--Commerce (NTIA) to assist in market aggregation; and Option 3--Specify and underwrite the development of a first generation public service satellite system.

OMB recommended Option 1 believing this was not a technological problem but one of needs. NASA agreed but argued that we should examine the needs for social service, recommending Option 2. All other agencies with the exception of Agriculture, AID, and Interior recommended Option 2. AID and Interior supported Option 3.

On technology sharing, strategy to utilize the Shuttle, possibility of declassifying intelligence imagery, space science and planetary exploration goals, there was inter-agency consensus. With respect to large scale ocean observation proposals, Commerce, NASA, and Defense will be making their proposal in the normal budgetary process and if necessary, the PRC(Space) will address any policy implications.

Based on the decisions reached at the meeting, the Chairman stated that a memorandum to the President and draft Presidential policy statement will be prepared and circulated for interagency comment prior to submission to the President. He emphasized that rapid turn around--two days--may be necessary.

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SECRET--XGDS (2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

78-2786

28 September 1978

DD/A Registry
File *Security*

DD/A Registry
78-3819/2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : NSC Coordinator

SUBJECT : President's discussion of "fact of" Photoreconnaissance

1. Per a call from [] at 1100 this morning, the following is how the President currently intends to deal with the subject in his 1 October speech:

a. The context is one of

- honoring space pioneers and heroes
- applauding the great achievements of the last 20 years
- promising similar achievements and progress in the future

b. The pertinent part of his speech regarding "fact of" reads as follows:

"Photoreconnaissance satellites have become an important stabilizing factor in world affairs. Their contribution to the security of our nation -- to the security of all nations -- is immense. We shall continue to develop them."

(N.B. The last sentence reappears several times throughout the speech as the President talks about various space efforts).

2. [] asked me to check and see if this wording would be satisfactory in light of previous discussion on the subject.

3. A complete copy of the draft speech will be available later today.

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MC 2 Oct.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DD/A Registry

78-3819/3

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
September 29, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY

SUBJECT: Guidance on Public Queries Related to
Declassification of the "Fact of"
Photoreconnaissance Satellites

The attached reflects the Administration policy regarding public queries to be observed by all Departments and Agencies commencing October 2, 1978. All public queries are to be referred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs at this time for response.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

Enclosure
Press Guidance

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Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080002-9

CLASSIFIED BY Zbigniew Brzezinski

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL--XGDS (2)~~

Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080002-9

Press Guidance on Questions Related to President's Statement
on U.S. Satellite Photoreconnaissance

Comments shall not go beyond the President's direction to acknowledge that the U.S. conducts satellite photoreconnaissance including acknowledgement that photoreconnaissance is one of the NTMS used to verify compliance with SALT and other arms control agreements. In particular, spokesmen are not to comment on any questions relating to: (1) the capabilities of these systems; (2) their operation; (3) comparison to other U.S. or foreign reconnaissance systems; (4) uses of photoreconnaissance satellites other than the "generic" fact and/or support of arms control agreements; (5) other types of classified satellites; (6) specific form and dissemination of information obtained by photosatellites; (7) uses of such information other than for "national security requirements" and/or verification of arms control agreements; (8) any other aspect of overhead reconnaissance.

To foster uniformity and best protect security, the only office to respond to inquiries from the public at this time concerning "fact of" and "facts about" photoreconnaissance activities of the U.S. will be the Office of the Secretary of Defense. All queries will be referred to OSD/PA.

Questions and authorized answers are attached. Unless a question can be answered by reference to the President's statement, this guidance, or the attached Q's and A's, OSD spokesmen shall clear all other responses to queries with the National Security Council.

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Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080002-9

CLASSIFIED BY Zbigniew Brzezinski

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

58 (2)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON IMPDET

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. How good is the quality of the pictures our satellites take?

A. Very good. I cannot go into specific detail regarding the capabilities of these systems.

Q. How often do we photograph a given area?

A. Photoreconnaissance coverage is contingent on national security requirements and requirements to verify compliance with arms control agreements. I cannot discuss the specific operational characteristics of our photoreconnaissance systems.

Q. What do we photograph from satellites?

A. We use photoreconnaissance satellites to monitor certain activities that are relevant to compliance with arms control agreements and other national security requirements.

Q. Do we take satellite photographs of other countries besides the Soviet Union?

A. We use photoreconnaissance satellites to monitor certain activities that are relevant to compliance with arms control agreements and other national security requirements.

Q. Do we ever photograph the U.S. from space?

A. Yes. Periodically, we operate these systems over the U.S. in a manner that preserves and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties.

Q. Who operates the satellites we use to verify arms control agreements?

A. Those satellites are operated by the Department of Defense at the direction of the President and the National Security Council. I cannot comment on details of operational control.

- Q. Who sees the results?
- A. The results of satellite photoreconnaissance are available to appropriate analysts and policymakers in the Executive and Legislative Branches.
- Q. Have we ever shown photographs taken by these satellites to the Soviets?
- A. No.
- Q. Do we show these satellite photographs to our Allies?
- A. We share information with our Allies.
- Q. Does the Soviet Union also use satellite photography?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How can we be sure that the Soviets won't destroy our satellites?
- A. The SALT ONE agreements and the draft SALT TWO treaty specifically prohibit Soviet interference with U.S. national technical means of verification which include photoreconnaissance satellites. In addition, we are currently engaged in discussions with the Soviets aimed at limiting anti-satellite capabilities. The White House statement on space policy issued last June reaffirms that an attack on a U.S. satellite would clearly be a hostile act.
- Q. Is it legal to take pictures from outer space?
- A. Yes, the use of photoreconnaissance satellites is consistent with the Outer Space Treaty of 1977 and is not precluded by any principle of international law. The SALT ONE agreements specifically provide that national technical means will be used for verification of compliance with the agreements. The draft SALT TWO agreement nearing completion also refers to the use of such means of verification.

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Q. Do we use photographic satellites to spy on other countries?

A. Photoreconnaissance satellites help us to verify compliance with the terms of arms control agreements.

Q. Does the phrase "national technical means" refer to other devices besides photoreconnaissance satellites?

A. Yes. Verification of different arms control agreements necessarily involves various types of technology. For instance, a seismic detection system would be the principal means of verifying compliance with agreements that limit underground nuclear testing.

Q. Is the use of photographic satellites to verify SALT agreements something new? If you were reluctant to talk about those satellites before, why are you doing so now?

A. The President's explicit reference is the result of a number of considerations. First, it is related to a reassessment of our security classification procedures, in order to make as much information available as possible without jeopardizing national security. Second, it is part of a general review of our national space program. By referring to our use of photoreconnaissance satellites, we want to make clear to the public that verification of SALT agreements is based on our own technical capabilities and does not depend on Soviet good faith or assurances.

Q. I understand that the President decided last spring that the fact that the U.S. conducts satellite photoreconnaissance should remain classified. Is that true? If so, why did the President change his mind?

A. Many aspects of our space policy have been under continuing review since the White House announcement of this policy made last June. As I said before, one factor that led to the President's statement was our desire to promote public understanding of our ability to verify a new SALT agreement and arms control agreements generally.

Q. How is the President's statement related to the Kampiles incident?

A. The Kampiles case is presently in litigation and therefore any comments relating to the case are inappropriate.

Q. Will the reported loss of a manual describing one of our satellites damage our ability to conduct photo-reconnaissance from space?

A. The Kampiles case is presently in litigation and therefore any comments relating to the case are inappropriate.

Q. Since the Soviets reportedly know how good the capabilities of our photographic satellites are, why don't you release some sample pictures so that the American public can know too?

A. For a number of reasons I must emphasize that both the photographs and analyses based on them remain classified however are available to the President, his senior advisers, and to the Congress.

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Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600080002-9

28 September 1978

DD/A Registry

78-3819/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : NSC Coordinator

SUBJECT : Space PRC Meeting of 20 September 1978

The attached Memorandum for the Record, written by is provided for your information. As you are aware, subsequent actions relating to the "fact of" photoreconnaissance satellites have been undertaken during the past week.

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Distribution:

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DD/A Registry

78-3819

21 September 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Space PRC Meeting on 20 September 1978

The subject meeting was held from 0930 to 1130 with [REDACTED] representing the DCI and [REDACTED] also in attendance.

1. "Fact Of" (0930 to 1000 with participants limited to State, ACDA, Defense, JCS, DCI, NASA, OMB, and NSC).

Each participant expressed his views as follows:

State - Urgent need to declassify now (not later than just after election) to support SALT ratification. No declassification of product.

ACDA - Similar to State's view but not quite so strong.

Defense - Declassification can be accomplished but there must be adequate preparation prior to an announcement.

JCS - The issue should be reviewed thoroughly prior to a Presidential decision. There may be serious risks that have been overlooked.

DCI - No objection in principle to declassification after adequate preparation. Limited gains and risks with declassification alone. DCI concerned with what will come out at Kampiles trial. We should defer action until the end of the first trial since "fact of" will probably be revealed at that time.

NASA - Felt that the benefits for SALT were minimal. Supported declassification, after adequate preparation, but felt major benefits would accrue from potential release of imagery.

OMB - Supported declassification but felt that benefits for SALT were overstated unless imagery was released.

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SUBJECT: Space PRC Meeting on 20 September 1978

NSC - Supported declassification. Agreed that imagery would also have to be released (and commented that release of imagery was a desirable outcome).

Consensus appeared to be:

- (1) In support of declassification.
- (2) Benefits for SALT were minimal.
- (3) In favor of adequate preparation but no agreement on how long that was. (Several days to several months).

There was also some discussion opposing the idea of letting the "fact of" be revealed in the course of the Kampiles trial. Argument against was the loss of the positive value of having the President reveal it. (This later became clarified when we were told that they would like this announcement to be made in the President's planned 1 October speech at Kennedy Space Center).

Action: A memo for the President on this issue would be prepared in two weeks. DCI would have action on preparation of implementation plan, State would have action on a consultation plan, and ACDA would prepare D&A's. [] asked that Justice also be involved because of the Kampiles trial.

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2. Other issues (1000 to 1130. Full participation by the SPRC agencies).

a. Key Elements of Civil Space Policy: General consensus on these elements. General view that they should be "jazzed" up to be more positive and less bureaucratic.

b. Operational LANDSAT System: Most preferred Option 2. State, NASA, and a few others preferred Option 3 (or at least 2+). JCS and OMB preferred Option 1. The DCI expressed a slight preference for Option 2 because of his need for LANDSAT data for foreign crop forecasting.

c. Federal Role in Civil COMSAT R&D: Consensus for Option 2. Will not go to President as an issue but as a recommended action. DCI took no position.

d. Public Service Communications Satellite: No consensus with advocates primarily for Options 1 and 2. DCI took no position.

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e. Recommended Actions: There was no time for a discussion. Dr. Press asked for written comments, if any. He also said that he would accept factual corrections to the report.

Action: Memo to the President would be prepared and coordinated. Would like Presidential decision prior to the 1 October speech at Kennedy Space Center.



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 EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

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1	DCI		X		
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5	DD/CT		X		
6	DD/A		X		
7	DD/O		X		
8	DD/S&T		X		
9	GC		X		
10	LC		X		
11	IG		X		
12	Compt				
13	D/PA	X			
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	NSC Coord.		X		
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SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

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 2 October 1978

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

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Remarks:

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5 Oct 78

Date

3437 (4-75)

1	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <p>OK - I'll stay alert to spot other examples of gals that you know!</p> <p style="text-align: right;">13 OCT 1978</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Deputy Director for Administration 7D 24 Hqs.			13 Oct 78
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions

(40)

"OK - I'll stay alert to spot other examples & let you know! /s/Jack Blake"

DDA:JFBBlake: (13 Oct 78)
Distribution:

Orig RS - SA/DCI/CI (by hand) w/att
 1 - DDA Subj w/att
 1 - DDA Chrono
 1 - JFB Chrono

Att: Multiple addressee memo fr NSC dtd 5 Oct 78,
 subj: Summary of Conclusions for September 20, 1978
 Policy Review Committee (Space) Meeting(DDA78-3819/4)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
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COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:			
<p><i>I'm afraid this one isn't a good example. The invitations read the same as those listed in this ltr. i.e. to JCI.</i></p> <p><i>The error was made inside - by referring</i></p>			
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to CIA-		10/12	
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USGPO: 1976 - 202-953 (40)

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
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3	A/DDA		10 OCT 1978		
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5	DDA		10 OCT 1978		
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

I'm afraid this one isn't
a good example. The invitation
read the same as those listed
in this ltr. i.e. to JCI.
The error was made inside by referring

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to CIA	10/12
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☆USGPO: 1976 - 202-953

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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION SIGNATURE
Remarks:	
<p><i>OK - still stay alert to spot other angles that you have</i></p>	
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS	
Deputy Director for Administration	
7D 24 Hqs. []	
13 Oct 78	
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TO:

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11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
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SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

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3637 (4-78)

9 OCT 78
Date

"OK - I'll stay alert to spot other examples & let
you know! /s/Jack Blake"